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  • Juan Felipe Miranda Medina

“How can this problem be solved?”: Is it my problem as a philosopher?



Introduction

The call for papers of What is today's problem? states that “For philosophy, the interesting question is not “how can this problem be solved?” but rather “what kind of problem can allow X to appear?” or, “to which problem is X a response?”. While there is a great value in finding the philosophical roots of contemporary societal problems, with the kind encouragement from the editors, I would like to challenge the premise that “how can this problem be solved?” is an uninteresting question for philosophers. Furthermore, I claim that not only philosophers ought to care for how societal problems can be solved, but that they ought to engage directly in their solution, together with other willing human beings.

 

Following the spirit of the call, I begin by speculating about what philosophical view may be the origin of the notion that solving a societal problem is not interesting for philosophers today. Next, taking a pragmatic stance (which does not require a full commitment to pragmatism), I explain why solving a problem is an integral part of understanding its nature, and hence, a necessary step to provide a meaningful definition. Then I address the import of first-person experience and the need for a shared knowledge within the team that sets out to solve a societal problem.  In this work, the argument unfolds in dialogical form, which will hopefully make it intelligible to a wider audience, while at the same time addressing the many concerns that may arise as we reflect on the importance of solving societal problems for philosophers. In the conclusion the argument is restated succinctly, followed by some reflections on the implications that adopting a problem-solving stance may have for philosophy and philosophers. This work aims at being a provocation, rather than being so pretentious as to “resolve” a philosophical inquiry before it begins.


Dialogue

I. On common engagement in the solution of societal problems

Maria: What is the matter with you James? you look sad today.

James: Thank you for noticing, dear friend. It’s just that after watching the news it seems the world is upside down... Massive killings due to armed conflicts that don’t seem to have a solution, corruption ingrained in every link of the chain of our bureaucratic system, an ecological crisis that perhaps is unstoppable, and that is because of the political and economic system we have adopted. It is just overwhelming. And there seems as if there is nothing anyone can do.

Maria: I share your concern, James. Something that I’ve been wondering about in regards to all those terrible things you mention is “what do we philosophers do about it?”. I’ve come to the conclusion that philosophers ought to care for how societal problems can be solved. And not only that, they ought to engage directly in solving societal problems.

James: Even with this frustration and sadness upon my shoulders, I think you are pushing our job too far. Philosophy has many concerns, and while solving societal problems can be one of them, actually solving problems is not what philosophers are meant to do.

M: Let us put that view to the test, James, it might cheer you up.

J: Do you grant that both you and I, as the majority of philosophers, believe that the common good is desirable?

J: Yes, I do believe that.

M: Then, given that societal problems compromise the common good, every human being that is in the capacity to contribute to their solution ought to do so, and not just passively, as if being polite were going to change the world, but to the best of our abilities. Although people at parties may think of us as aliens, James, we philosophers happen to be human beings. Reflecting on the solution to a problem and engaging in its solution are both ways of contributing to the problem being solved.

J: You’re throwing some serious shade at our social finesse, Maria, and even though your argument is compelling, it would seem to apply to any specialist, urging them to engage directly in the solution of societal problems. I can’t imagine my colleagues at the Music Department will be thrilled.

M: Perhaps they won’t, but that does not exempt them from acting according to the best of their capacities and talents to solve societal problems.

J: Well, I think there is plenty of evidence that music has served as a key element to support or overthrow a political regime. Yet there are other disciplines where people are trained fundamentally to observe and theorize systematically about something, for example anthropologists and sociologists. At least “traditionally”, those of them who attempt to change the community with which they interact would be the exception rather than the rule.

M: That is true, and that’s a problem. Engineers like to make fun of us. In more than one occasion they have mocked me saying things like: “You people like fancy discourses on society and its problems, but you don’t like landing at possible solutions”.

J: I can’t imagine they are very versed on what the humanities and the social sciences are about...

M: They are certainly not, yet I do believe they have a point. Historically, the aim of our disciplines has been to observe, or to gain knowledge about reality, but not to transform it. On the other hand, even though engineers in their education develop this bold habit of building stuff and solving problems, they often have trouble applying their problem-solving skills to anything outside electronic circuits, mechanic systems, or the edification of buildings. That is my little devilish reply when they make fun of me.

J: Aren’t you a harsh critic, my kind devilish friend. Yet, I think this latter point is an encouragement to accept your first claim but dismiss your second one. Professionals can contribute to the solution of societal problems using their expertise, and that is the way in which they ought to contribute. Unfortunately, we can’t do much more than that. Although, I’ve talked to some friends in the engineering department, and they did have something in common.

M: What was it?

J: A void. Many of them say they feel their life lacks purpose because they know that in the end, the outcome of their work is to help someone make more money. When an engineer is hired to, say, reduce the energy consumption of a device, this is because the company wants to spend less budget in energy for the same time of usage of  the device, not because in any way they care about the environmental impact of producing energy.

M: James, I am proud of us. This discussion has been much shorter than usual and I sense that you already agree with me.

J: I am sorry to disappoint you, Maria, but I agree with you only in part. Perhaps the void in the lives of engineers that feel that everything is about money could be filled if they created new spaces to apply their skills for the common good. In other words, if they too engage in solving social problems. Yet, I still think specialists should take this initiative with the tools and in the manner their disciplines have trained them to do. Since specialists in the humanities are not trained to solve societal problems, it is up to others, governmental, Non-Governmental Organizations or other political actors to actually implement the solution. A clear way in which we philosophers can contribute to the solution of societal problems is to define what the problem is, or to identify what other problems might have given rise to them.

M: That is useful, but retrospective causal analysis, or definitions in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions only go thus far. James, why do you think it is that we often limit our job to defining things?

 

II. A brief speculation about what has lead philosophers to believe

that solving problems is uninteresting for philosophy

J: Well, Whitehead himself said that Western philosophy is but a series of footnotes to Plato. If you think about his dialogues, they tend to be quests to achieve clarity at definitions, often starting from misguided ones or from particular instances of where the definition could apply. In the case of virtue, you look at a loving father, a responsible citizen, a loyal friend, and you come to understand what virtue is. Or take knowledge, we reflect on particular instances in which we know, and thus we come to the definition of knowledge as Plato did, that knowledge is justified, true belief.

M: Oh yes, Plato’s famous emphasis on What Questions hunts us even today. “What is knowledge?”, “What is virtue?”, “What are abilities?”, “What are dispositions?”. 

J: I bet your rebellious spirit would eagerly dismiss all that as nonsense? Yet from a contemporary perspective, there is use in providing definitions, they are our best effort to encompass multiplicity in unity.

M: You underestimate me, dear. Humans can’t live without definitions, it’s so ingrained in our essence that we do it all the time through language. Defining things properly can be very useful. It allows us to find common features between a manifold of instances.

J: And there are many beautiful consequences from proper definitions. For example, when we develop an awareness of the common features of a manifold we can even come to identify instances that were not in our list of particulars, that appeared to be outside the manifold as we first construed it.

M: Yes, beautifully said. Through definitions we gain awareness of the space of possible instances that are tied to our definition.

J: Well then, I hope that you now agree that if we want to help solving problems, our main job as philosophers is to define them, or perhaps even to order discussions surrounding them. If we want to go beyond that, we could even follow a more Aristotelian approach, and identify the causes by which a problem comes to be.

M: I am glad that you brought up identifying the causes of something. This too is related to a thing’s definition, and I believe pragmatism elegantly makes sense of both.

J: But I am not a pragmatist.

M: You don’t have to declare yourself a pragmatist for their views to make sense.

J: How so?


III. Pragmatism’s  import to understanding a thing

M: I believe Peirce had a profound insight with his pragmatic maxim. After all, when he postulated it he was pondering how we can make our ideas clear. As I said, I agree that definitions in the more “traditional sense” are useful, but Peirce’s insight was in realizing that an essential part of our concept or definition of a thing is related to our capacity to foresee the relevant practical consequences that the thing has.

J: Peirce rings a bell, but last time I read him was in the undergraduate. How does the pragmatic maxim go?

M: Peirce says: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” [1].

J: You remember it by heart. Impressive! But now I recall why I was never fund of Peirce. Although he is sharp, he has a “talent” for odd sentences.

M: That is true. But perhaps an example provided by Peirce himself might help. What do we mean when we say “this diamond is hard”?

J: Diamonds are not my specialty, but I guess that we mean that if you hit it with something, the diamond doesn’t break.

M: Peirce says something very similar. You can try to scratch the diamond with this or that, but you it is very unlikely that you succeed. The point is that only when you try to scratch a hard thing and observe how it reacts, you come to understand hardness.

J: OK, the example makes sense. Nevertheless, I don’t know if I would grant that our conception of effects is the whole of our conception of an object, even though it has an import in our conception of it.

M: That is good enough for me.

J: And what does this have to do with societal problems?

M: Well, as Peirce noted, much of our understanding of a thing comes to be when we act upon it in specific ways, and in the case of a problem, when we try to solve it.

J: It makes sense, yet in the maxim as you stated it Peirce talked of “the object of our conception”. In the case of diamonds, was he thinking about scratching “this diamond”, or “diamonds in general”? In other words, does the pragmatic maxim apply to particulars or tokens only, or does it apply to types as well?

M: I don’t see why it couldn’t apply to both types and tokens. How about we test the pragmatic maxim with a practical example?

J: Good idea. Let’s talk about representative democracy. I for example, would define it as a system by which rulers act on behalf of the people they represent, and they ought to do so in the best interest of those people. 

M: Your definition sounds like a good starting point. But if we take the case of Chile in the 1970s, and of the whole of Latin America during that time, we see that it seems to be lacking something important. There was a clear “probing” of the concept of democracy when the Chilean people democratically elected a socialist regime.

J: Oh yes, Allende’s party. That didn’t end up very well for them.

M: It did not, the regime was obstructed from the start by right wing operations. Moreover, these were carried out with the close support and monitoring  of the CIA.

J: That can’t be right.

M: Don’t take my word for it. There are declassified documents that show it to be the case [2, 3].

J: Almost unbelievable. I know what the outcome was. We were only kids, but later in life I came to have good Chilean friends. You would not believe the brutality and crimes that were committed during Pinochet’s take over of Allende’s government.

M: There you go, probing the concept of democracy by attempting to establish a democratic regime that went against the capitalistic schemes of the main powers of the world, shows you something practical and new on democracy in a specific context. Representative democracy is not, as our first definition would have it, an affair that relates only the people within a nation to its government representatives. The representatives’ decisions and power to act are heavily dependent upon world powers, whether they be states or corporations, and internally on who has the resources and the power to favor or go against that regime.

 

IV. Why first-person experience is important

J: Well, then. I can grant that probing a problem gives us knowledge about its nature, after all, not always our first intuitions about possible causes or solutions are correct. From seeing how the problem “reacts”, as it were, there is much to be learned. But nevertheless, let others do that job, and let us philosophers devote ourselves to our task. We can write about their findings, abstract them, conceptualize them, develop a causal account, study their implications―

M: Yes, but there is so much we can oversee. I agree that it is useful to rely on other people’s accounts of what the problem is, or of what happened with the problem when you probed it. However, surveys, interviews, historical records only go thus far. On the other hand, if you are in the first row performing these attempts, when you share a reality with those directly affected by the problem. Thus, there is much to gain in terms of knowledge and experience.

J: Such as?

M: There are many things, James. I will list some of them, and I am sure that we can enjoy going into greater detail in other conversations.

J: Now I am really curious.

M: First, experiencing societal problems firsthand can foster empathy and a deeper understanding of the challenges faced by the communities deemed to live with the problem.

J: Mari, you know that empathy is a problematic term, it doesn’t have a univocal meaning.

M: Yes, but its definitions center around two key things: knowing what another person thinks or feels and responding with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another [4]. And this relates to my second point. Firsthand experience can also provide us with phronesis or practical wisdom, as your dear master, Aristotle, wisely pointed out [5]. By this I mean that with firsthand experience we can develop the ability to discern the right course of action in complex and uncertain situations, such as those we experience when we are affected by societal problems. Thereby we come to understand better how the problem affects the people for whose common good we worry about not only in terms of feelings (as would be in the case of empathy), but also of habits and capacities for action (phronesis).  Third, first-hand experience will give us even more motivation to work towards meaningful change because we are witnesses of the impact of societal problems on the community, and because it helps us grow and develop other capabilities, it fosters a deeper commitment to ethical engagement and social justice [6]. And fourth, by experiencing the problem firsthand we gain knowledge of the context in which the problem occurs in its different dimensions; social, cultural, economic and political.

J: Your first three reasons do make sense, but to this fourth one  I object, however. The sort of contextual knowledge does not need to be firsthand. Moreover, it is the job of of sociologists, anthropologists, historians, and political scientists to study those dimensions and report their findings.

M: Yes, in a sense, but why should we take these domains to be someone’s private property, as if professionals could demarcate what belongs to them? We ought rather to view it as an opportunity to work together and learn from our colleagues from other specialties. Take cultural anthropology, for example. There is much insight we could gain from the history of cultural anthropology and anthropologists’ change of paradigm. Instead of using external categories to describe a people’s practices or culture, they live with the people, share with them, become part of their community. An anthropologist comes to develop an awareness of their own positionality within the community, and from this reflexive perspective they reflect on a specific cultural phenomenon, a practice, or a societal problem. Listening, observing, and being a part of it is fundamental to their method. Insofar as societal problems are cultural problems, this is an approach that could enrich philosophical thought on this matter.

J: Why not let anthropologists do that job?

M: Of course! But we must consider that two anthropologists conducting fieldwork at the same location can have different accounts about the problem... and this is good for us! A philosopher conducting fieldwork is likely to develop a different, complementary and useful account to an anthropologist, given that we have a different background and “toolkit” altogether.

J: OK, so then you end up with two different accounts, one by a philosopher and one by the anthropologist. How would you relate the two? Would you choose one over the other? I don’t think anthropologists would be very happy about you, first, mingling in their field, and then, dismissing their account of a problem.

M: You are right. Surely we can’t arbitrarily dismiss one of the two, neither is it necessarily the case that philosophers even have the required knowledge to judge which of the two is the most useful.

J: You finally agree with me! This is too good to be true.

M: Don’t be hasty, James. I agree with the point you’ve made, but that brings us to an important fact. Complex problems cannot be solved by one person alone. We need a team, and if we are to solve societal problems anthropologists, philosophers, and human beings in general have to work as a team, together with those affected by the problem in question, of course!

 

V. Optimal teamwork in problem solving

 

J: I still think you want to complicate things unnecessarily, Maria, for an anthropologist carrying out the fieldwork and writing an ethnography which he then cares to share with a philosopher might very well be regarded as a team. The philosopher might have useful views, questions, and perhaps even ideas of solutions, but using our own tools!

M: You are right, James. Perhaps that could be regarded as a team, but would it be the best possible team? If we agree that we are concerned and really do want to solve large, complex problems that have plagued humanity for centuries, wouldn’t you agree that just “working as any team” is not enough?

J: Well―

M: Surely it is not! We have to work as the best team possible together with all the kind souls that care to work on the problem. In other words, we could say that I am invoking a “principle of optimality” for the constitution and operation of the team: we want the team to be as effective as it can be in its mission of solving a given societal problem.

J: And how do you know that a team works better if some of its members share a common reality? Perhaps even communication between team members may be overrated and the team manages to operate optimally when each of its members sticks to their labor, to what they actually know how to do.

M: I am glad you asked. I was in doubt myself, so I started digging in the literature. It turns out that teamwork and cognitive concepts related to it have been the subject of extensive research for several decades [7, 8]. This should not surprise us, after all, in our capitalist, production-driven world, effective teams are necessary to achieve the company’s goals.

J: Well, but before you continue, don’t you think we should define what a team is? One could reasonably define a team as a group of individuals that work together towards one ore more common goals [9].

M: I agree, but let us point out that not any random individual can be counted as a team member. From what I’ve read, in order for individuals to belong to a given team they must: (1) have specific roles, (2) perform interdependent tasks, (3) interact, and (4) be adaptable [9].

J: Our definition of team makes sense, Maria, but I’m afraid, on your behalf, that I can endorse it and still stick to my view. Let philosophers do philosophy in the way they habitually do philosophy, even if it is philosophy about a societal problem [9, 10].

M: Don’t get ahead of me, James. We haven’t yet talked about how the principle of team optimality impacts the interactions within the team and its organization. In other words, we ought to ask: what must be in place for the team to operate optimally? I read a very interesting study of teamwork in High-Reliability Organizations, that is, organizations that operate in hazardous environments where the consequence of errors is high [9].

J: You mean, for example, hospitals and the health system?

M: Yes, that is a good example, and it turns out that teamwork is more complicated than it would seem.

J: Why so?

M: For the team to work effectively together, specialists say, team members must possess “knowledge, skills and attitudes” [9]. That is, they should have skill in monitoring each other’s performances, knowledge of their own responsibilities as well as those of their teammates, they should anticipate the needs of others through this knowledge, they should adjust to each other’s actions so as to accomplish the team’s common goals. The team members ought to communicate effectively, and they should have a shared understanding of how a procedure should happen. Another key requirement is mutual trust between team members, that is, they should have the shared belief that team members will perform their roles and protect the interests of their teammates. Moreover, they ought to have shared mental models.

J: And what do these models refer to?

M: It is desirable that all team members have very similar mental representations of the task at hand and of the team itself. This allows them to coordinate their actions without the need to coordinate overtly. If you think about it, as academic philosophers we are very familiar with many of these requirements from our exchange with administrators and the management of the department.

J: Oh, Maria, you are hitting a raw nerve, but yes, I think that relation is one that many academics experience with frustration. Administrators are often the ones deciding how our lecturers work, what is the wage for the time we invest on them, and how we ought to report that we are doing their job.

M: And moreover, today all lecturers are expected to conduct research and publish. 

J: Yes! I confess that I have talked to several colleagues within and outside the department. It was “fascinating” to learn that most administrators have no clue about the competence of the department. For example, an administrator of a philosophy department may know nothing about philosophy, or may not have carried out philosophical research at all. Lecturers often feel exploited, misunderstood, and lacking the material means to carry out their jobs, and without a proper acknowledgement of their work.

M: But James, then you are on my side already! I should have been more clever and get you started talking about the department.

J: Then we would have missed all the fun of this exchange. You have managed to cheer me up a bit. Nevertheless, if we think about it, what would we have the university do? A philosophy professor could be a terrible administrator.

M: This might be the case, but an option would be to have a willing philosopher to be trained in administrative matters that at least has a voice within administration decisions. After all, we did say that team members must have independent roles, yet fulfill interdependent tasks.

J: Well, in that case another option would be to have an administrator that is so engaged that they sit in the lectures now and then, that they talk with the teachers, that they learn a bit about the discipline.

M: Yes, in that way we can act as one, both in regards to our positive aspect of solving the problem, I mean, what we do to solve it, and in regards to what we do when problems arise as we try to solve the problem.

J:  This “acting as one” sounds sort of hylomorphic to me [11]. You know that I’m not a fan of the pragmatists, but I do love Aristotle. How much could a man explain relying on the conjunction of matter and form. 

M: I do remember your marked preference for him. In my case, “acting as one” evoques Leibniz’s harmony: diversitate identitate compensata [12].

J: “Diversity compensated by unity”. Or we can put on our Spinozian hat and think of it as the striving of a thing that comprises several modes all of which articulate for the thing to persevere in its being [13].

M: Oh yes! The one and only Spinoza. But you see? We philosophers have so many ways of thinking about bringing to unity what otherwise would be a plurality, all the more reason to tackle complex societal problems as a team with many agents engaged. We have to have a clue about how the others operate, about what their specialty is about, about how they understand and characterize problems.

J: Yes, and as you said, most important of all, we have to have the solidarity to experience those problems―

M: In our own flesh!

J: To understand their magnitude, their nature.

M: Yes, dear James, to grasp that experiential dimension that is so meaningful to us human beings.

J: I must admit you are almost making a believer out of me, but I have a worry. What if the problem to solve is war, should we travel to the site putting one’s  life in danger? If one dies, then we have one worker less to solve the problem.

M: Well, your worry is an honest one. Those are difficult decisions, but perhaps instead of going to the site we can speak to refugees, to visit sites that are more accessible, to do our best effort to become immersed in their reality, to foster a community if we are in the capacity to do so. We cannot philosophize about war sitting at our desk, or thinking that our job is to define what war is, or what gives rise to it.

J: Shall we go now and visit our friends in administration, then?

Summary of the argument

The claim upheld and developed throughout the dialogue is that philosophers ought to care about how a societal problem can be solved, and they ought to engage in solving societal problems. Caring about societal problems means that a societal problem becomes an object of philosophical investigation. Engaging in solving societal problems means that philosophers are not satisfied with exercising philosophical thought in the comfort of their chair, based on information about the problem that other agents may facilitate, but that they actively attempt to solve the problem as part of a team, sharing the reality of those affected by the problem.

 

This is because:

l   Moral argument: If we care about the common good, every human being that is in the capacity to contribute to their solution ought to do so.

l   Abstract definitions and pragmatism: Although abstract definitions of a problem may reveal common patterns in specific instances of the problem, there are aspects of the nature of the problem that only become evident when we try to solve it.

l   First person experience: It is true that others can engage in direct solution using their own methods (e.g., anthropologists, sociologists, etc) and produce information for a philosopher to work on using their own methods as well, but there is information that we miss when we do not experience it first hand. First person experience can foster empathy and ethical commitment, develop phronesis to act in the reality created by the problem, and gain contextual knowledge on the problem and its consequences.

l   Multi-directional interaction in teamwork: Furthermore, societal problems are difficult to solve, and this has two consequences. First, we can only solve them if we work together with other agents. Second, we ought to do so in the most effective manner possible (“principle of optimality”) because if not, since our attempts will not be as strong as they could be, are more likely to fail. In other words, we have to work as a team. In effective teams, team members have knowledge of the tasks, needs and methods of other members. Thus, they can anticipate the needs of others and adapt to them, so as to achieve an adaptive coordination of the individual actions of team members to achieve a team’s goal.

l   This entails that philosophers have to engage solving societal problems moving beyond armchair philosophy, spending quality time with other agents so as to become a team with them, and at the same time, seeking together to have first-hand knowledge of the problem in question.

 

The modest argument I propose is but a provocation. Hopefully it will be enough to get us triggered about whether philosophers can engage in more direct action in problems that are latent in today’s world.


References

[1] Peirce, C. S. (1877/1958). How to Make Our Ideas Clear. Popular Science Monthly, v. 12, pp. 286–302. Reprinted in Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce (CP) v. 5, p. 293, paragraphs 388–410.

[2] Shiraz, Z. (2011). CIA Intervention in Chile and the Fall of the Allende Government in 1973. Journal of American Studies, 45(3), 603-613.

[3] Devine, J. (2014). What really happened in Chile: The CIA, the coup against Allende, and the rise of Pinochet. Foreign Aff., 93, 26.

[4] Batson, C. D. (2009). These things called empathy: Eight related but distinct phenomena. In J. Decety & W. Ickes (Eds.), The Social Neuroscience of Empathy (pp. 3-15). MIT Press.

[5] Crisp, R. (Ed.). (2014). Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics. Cambridge University Press.

[6] Nussbaum, M. C. (2011). Creating capabilities: The human development approach. Harvard University Press.

[7] Mathieu, J. E., Hollenbeck, J. R., van Knippenberg, D., & Ilgen, D. R. (2017). A century of work teams in the Journal of Applied Psychology. Journal of applied psychology, 102(3), 452.

[8] van Rensburg, J. J., Santos, C. M., de Jong, S. B., & Uitdewilligen, S. (2022). The five-factor perceived shared mental model scale: a consolidation of items across the contemporary literature. Frontiers in Psychology, 12, 784200.

[9] Baker, D. P., Day, R., & Salas, E. (2006). Teamwork as an essential component of high‐reliability organizations. Health services research, 41(4p2), 1576-1598.

[10] Mathieu, J., Maynard, M. T., Rapp, T., & Gilson, L. (2008). Team effectiveness 1997-2007: A review of recent advancements and a glimpse into the future. Journal of management, 34(3), 410-476.

[11] Aristotle, A., & Aristotle. (1933). Metaphysics (Vol. 1, pp. 980a-981a). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[12] Carlin, L. (2000). On the very concept of harmony in Leibniz. The Review of Metaphysics, 100.

[13] de Spinoza, B. (2020). Spinoza's ethics. Princeton University Press.

 

Davini, C. (2020). Charles S. Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim: Some Epistemological Issues. Scienza & Filosofia_ no 24, pp. 269-283. https://www.scienzaefilosofia.com/2020/12/18/charles-s-peirces-pragmatic-maxim-some-epistemological-issues/

 

Schmitter, P. C., & Karl, T. L. (1991). What democracy is... and is not. Journal of democracy, 2(3), 75-88.

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